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This paper undertakes three challenging tasks. First, I attempt to lay out the dimen-
sions of the current financial crisis that confronts intercollegiate athletics. Second, 
I propose three reforms that I believe, if enacted, would go a long way toward 
ameliorating the financial situation and also bring the practice of college sports 
more in line ethically with its purported mission. Third, I assess the prospects of 
these reforms being carried out, given the history of failed reform efforts in the past.
The Financial Landscape
Although there is a group of economists who argue that big-time college athlet-
ics departments run a surplus in reality, I am not in that group. Based on figures 
I have seen from the NCAA, from the EADA, from individual conferences and 
individual schools, I believe that all but a handful of schools’ athletic departments 
run a deficit when properly accounted. Indeed, the late NCAA President Myles 
Brand stated on a number of occasions that only a half dozen schools run a true 
surplus on a consistent basis. Similar appraisals were made by his predecessors 
Ced Dempsey and Dick Schultz.
Consider the NCAA figures. According to its 2009 report for the 2007–08 
year, out of 119 schools in the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) of Division I 
(formerly DIA), only 25 athletic departments generated a net operating surplus.1 
These schools had an average reported operating surplus of $3.87 million. The 
remaining 94 schools generated an athletic operating deficit, which, among them, 
averaged $9.87 million. For the entire 119 schools, the median operating deficit 
was $8.1 million (Fulks, 2009).2
The NCAA does not release financial figures for individual colleges and other 
than incomplete and irregular data reported to the U.S. Department of Education 
in the annual EADA reports and the release of program financials in public record 
documents, the public rarely gets a candid look at the bottom line for particular 
athletic departments. However, budgetary information of the athletic department 
at the University of California, Berkeley was made public in early November 
2009. According to the information sheet, the school’s athletic department was a 
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net loser of between $7.4 million and $13.5 million every year between 2003–04 
and 2009–10, costing the university a total of $78.1 million over this seven-year 
period. Furthermore, these losses do not include the annual debt service on two 
new capital projects (the $321 million renovation of Memorial Stadium and the 
$136 million Student Athlete High Performance Center; access to the latter will 
restricted to the school’s 450 student-athletes).3
It is important to point out that the summary NCAA figures can be misleading. 
Although Jim Isch, Dan Fulks and others have made heroic efforts to standardize and 
rationalize intercollegiate athletic accounting and reporting practices, there remains 
a great deal to be done. I won’t go into all the gory details, but a few salient issues 
should be mentioned. First, schools do not regularly report capital expenses and 
those that do, do so unevenly and incompletely. As Jonathan and Peter Orszag have 
demonstrated in their 2005 study for the NCAA, capital costs, properly reckoned, 
can be appreciable. Based on facility replacement cost, the Orszags estimated an 
annual capital cost in DIA athletic departments of $24 million, just a few million 
dollars below the average annual operating costs of DIA intercollegiate athletics 
departments at the time (Orszag and Orszag, 2005). Alternatively, NCAA data 
reveals that the top decile of FBS programs paid out a median of $6.56 million of 
debt service on a debt of $98.1 million in 2007–08. This debt service is generally 
paid outside the athletics department (e.g., by the university or the state) and does 
not appear as an expense item in the athletics department budget. Thus, if capital 
costs were fully and properly accounted, it is safe to assume that these reported 
deficits would balloon significantly.
Second, it is not clear to what extent indirect costs are included in the finan-
cial reports of athletic departments. Although NCAA reporting forms have been 
modified to call for the inclusion of many indirect costs, the instructions are often 
not explicit or detailed. Some schools may include, for instance, estimates of the 
costs for the time university administrators spend on athletics, while others may 
not. The same is true for a pro rata share of the administrative building capital and 
operating costs. And so on.
Third, schools follow varying practices regarding accounting for athletic 
grants-in-aid (GIAs). The basic conundrum here is that some schools count the 
value of the GIA at full tuition and room and board, when the marginal tuition cost 
may be negligible. If a school has empty beds in its dormitories, the marginal cost 
of filling such a bed with an athlete is trivial. If that athlete attends classes, there 
is no additional instructional cost, and the athlete is sleeping in a bed that would 
otherwise be empty. The athletics department might record the operating cost 
associated with this athlete’s GIA at its full nominal value, say $35,000, while the 
actual incremental cost to the school might be closer to $5,000 or $10,000.4 To the 
extent that this experience applies at certain state universities, athletics costs and 
operating deficits are overstated.
Fourth, where generated revenue is used, the exclusion of student fees may 
understate the market value created from student attendance at games. Practices 
at different schools vary widely, regarding the size and use of the student fee and 
whether students are given free tickets or sold subsidized tickets to sporting contests.
To be sure, when all adjustments are made, it seems that true athletics deficits 
would be considerably larger than reported deficits; that is, the omitted costs appear 
to significantly exceed the overstated costs. The reasons for this are manifold. Fore-
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most among them is that athletic departments are large, not-for-profit bureaucracies. 
Rather than following a bottom-line imperative to boost quarterly profits and stock 
prices, they tend to follow the bureaucratic imperative to grow at any cost and to do 
anything they can to win. Actual FBS budgets, then, run in substantial deficit and 
the gap between expenses and revenues is growing at the vast majority of schools.
What about the often heard responses that the value of big-time college athlet-
ics lies in its ability to (a) increase student applications and (b) generate increases 
in donations to the university general fund?
One hears frequent claims that a successful football or basketball team increases 
student applications5 and that this, in turn, enables a school to be more selective 
and increase the quality of its student body. While it appears to generally be the 
case that big-time athletics success may modestly increase applications, it is less 
clear that that this increase leads to better students. The reason is that the large 
majority of new applications tend to be from students at the bottom of the academic 
performance ladder. The econometric scholarship on the effect on student quality is 
somewhat contradictory. Nonetheless, the bulk of the extant econometric research 
suggests that any such effect is either nonexistent or small and short-lived (Pope 
and Pope, 2009).6
An important related point is that many large state universities do not fill all 
their beds. If athletics success increases applications, even if the school is not able 
to be more selective, it may be able to increase enrollment and, hence, revenue. In 
this way, athletics success may provide a financial benefit.
The literature is also somewhat uneven and inconclusive on the question of 
athletics success promoting donations to a school’s general fund. Undoubtedly, 
there are some schools, particularly those experiencing a meteoric rise from athlet-
ics oblivion to national prominence, where success does lead boosters, alumnae, 
and state legislators to open their wallets. In general, however, to the extent that 
some studies find a positive and significant effect in panel data studies, it is very 
modest in magnitude. Many studies find no significant effect.7 While it is likely 
that athletics success will lead to increased giving to the athletics department 
or its foundation, giving to the general fund is more uncertain. Indeed, there is 
evidence that increased donations to athletics have cannibalized donations to the 
general fund. For instance, between 1998 and 2003, a period when overall giving 
to universities was flat, athletics departments received an increased share of total 
gifts—from 14.7% to 26%.8
Both in the case of increased applications and increased donations, it is 
necessary to remember that a positive and significant coefficient implies that the 
relationship goes in both directions. That is, if improved athletics performance 
generates increased applications or donations, then deteriorated performance will 
engender decreases in applications and donations. In the end, the average win 
percentage is .500, and one college’s gain will be another’s loss. A particular col-
lege will also find its gain one year, may be its loss the next if it cannot sustain its 
athletics success. Moreover, the quest for victory often leads schools to transgress 
NCAA rules. Investigations and scandals may ensue and their negative impact 
may last for years.9
From the perspective of an individual university, even if a clear link could 
be established between athletics success and increased applications or donations, 
there is an opportunity cost in investing in improved athletics performance. If a 
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university’s goal is increased applications or donations, then investing in athletics 
must be compared with investing in the best alternative. Only if athletics investment 
yields higher returns than, say, investing in excellent faculty, science laboratories or 
growing the development office would it make economic sense to increase spending 
on athletics. Further, competition among schools to capture the expected gains from 
athletics success would eventually eliminate those gains, as schools spent more and 
more money on recruitment, facilities, coaches’ salaries and the like, while the fact 
remained that only ten schools can be ranked in the top ten.10
The final pattern to observe is that the situation appears to be growing worse in 
the aggregate and also distributionally. A 2009 Knight Commission study reported 
that in the FBS athletic spending has been growing at four times the rate of the 
general educational budget (Weiner, 2009). The 2009 Revenues and Expenses 
Report of the NCAA found that the median net operating deficit for FBS athletic 
programs grew from $5.57 million in fiscal year 2005 to $8.09 million in fiscal 
2008, a 45.4% increase over the three years (Fulks, 2009, p. 19).
As the aggregate situation deteriorates, the top schools in the leading confer-
ences continue to be able to generate operating surpluses. Meanwhile, the condition 
for all the other programs grows worse and worse. The 119 FBS schools constitute 
the upper echelon of athletic programs among the over 1200 colleges belonging 
to the NCAA. In 2005–06, the 19 programs that reported an operating surplus 
(based on generated revenue) had a median surplus of $4.3 million, while the 100 
programs with an operating deficit reported a median deficit of $8.9; that is, the 
gap between these two groups of have and have-nots was $13.2 million. This gap 
had grown by $2 million since 2003–04 (Brown, 2008).
If the 119 FBS athletic programs are divided into deciles, the following 
pattern emerges for the 2006–07 academic year. As depicted in Table 1, the 
median revenue of programs in the lowest decile (ranked by revenue) was $13.1 
million, while that of the highest decile was $89.1 million, almost seven times 
higher than the lowest ten percent of programs. It is important to emphasize that 
these figures are for total revenue; that is, they include both revenues generated 
by the athletics department and allocated revenues (transfers from the university 
and the public sector). If only generated revenues were considered, the bottom 
decile would have a median of $5.4 million, while the top decile would have a 
median of $89.0 million—for a top-to-bottom ratio of over 16–1.11 Only the top 
decile reports a surplus without institutional subsidies, and, again, these figures 
exclude capital expenses.
Despite the clear superiority in the performance of the top decile, when capital 
and indirect expenses are included in the balance, it is probable that not even all the 
top ten percent of revenue programs generate a surplus in a typical year.
The economic challenges are greater still if one acknowledges that (a) the 
NCAA’s rules restrict an athlete’s GIA in most cases to being $2,500 or more below 
the full cost of attending college, (b) the NCAA and its member schools in Division 
I face a serious antitrust and unjust enrichment challenge over their appropriation 
of athletes’ publicity rights,13 and (c) despite impressive progress, women still 
lag well behind men in athletics participation and resource allocation. Across the 
NCAA in 2007–08, women were 42.6% of all athletes (this share was basically 
stagnant during the two terms of the Bush administration), but approximately 55% 
of all undergraduate students.
Dollar Dilemmas During the Downturn    115
The financial landscape, then, is marked by widespread and growing deficits, 
as well as a deepening divide between the have and have not schools. The 2008–09 
global financial crisis and economic downtown have only exacerbated the already 
untenable situation. Further, the concomitant crisis in the financing of higher edu-
cation and increasing questions about the future viability of the basic economic 
model of U.S. universities shine yet a brighter light on the growing deficits in 
intercollegiate athletics.
There is a saying of growing currency that no good recession should go to waste. 
Recessions are a time to curb excesses and waste, and many athletic programs have 
been shaken out of their longstanding complacency and growing extravagance into 
a cost cutting mode. So some positive steps have been taken by certain schools and 
conferences,14 but they are all incremental and insufficient given the magnitude 
of the problem.
Even the Athletic Directors of Division I have recognized that business as usual 
is not sustainable and they have called for a series of reforms, such as cutting back 
on glossy media guides, shortening the playing season in nonrevenue sports (this is 
likely to be in violation of Title IX), reducing traveling squads, restricting off-season 
practices, eliminating some sports, and ending the common practice of lodging teams 
at local hotels before home games. There is also the danger, however, that, as in the 
past, some reforms will spring loopholes. For instance, several years ago the NCAA 
passed a regulation that prevented student-athletes from being segregated in separate 
housing. Schools began to put student-athletes in special married graduate student 
housing complexes, which, in effect, had the same impact as segregated housing. If 
student-athletes are prohibited from staying in local hotels, the response may be to 
build more luxurious “graduate student” housing. Notably, the Division I athletic 
directors stayed away from recommending more substantial reforms; thus, while the 
AD’s plan may slow the pace of ballooning deficits, it is unlikely to reverse the tide.15
In the next section, I suggest some deeper measures that could make more 
significant contributions to achieving fiscal sanity and greater financial balance in 
big-time intercollegiate athletics.
Table 1 FBS Revenue and Expenditure Distribution Median  
By Decile, 2006–0712
Deciles
Grand Total 
Expenditures Grand Total Revenue
Grand Total 
Generated Revenue
1 $14,143,000 $13,135,000 $5,351,000
2 $19,705,000 $19,954,000 $7,925,000
3 $23,417,000 $23,390,000 $11,609,000
4 $27,955,000 $27,098,000 $15,062,000
5 $33,783,000 $33,783,000 $24,652,000
6 $42,967,000 $44,944,000 $35,283,000
7 $52,255,000 $53,719,000 $47,756,000
8 $57,987,000 $60,967,000 $58,167,000
9 $68,377,000 $72,256,000 $70,358,000
10 $83,135,000 $89,080,000 $89,028,000
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Policy Reforms for Fiscal Solvency
Unless they decide to opt out of competition, schools cannot solve the budgetary 
crisis on their own. Competitive forces compel ADs to spend on coaches, facilities 
and amenities. The only reasonable path to reform is through collective action. The 
problem is certain types of collective action by the NCAA can be construed to be 
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Seek a Partial Antitrust Exemption to Regulate Coaches’ 
Salaries
Examples of waste abound in Division I athletics, but perhaps the most egregious 
is the salaries paid to head football and men’s basketball coaches—which often 
exceed the salaries of the university’s president by a factor of 5–10.16 Today, there 
are over 100 college football coaches with compensation packages exceeding $1 
million; there are more than a dozen exceeding $3 million, and several exceed $4 
or $5 million in monetary compensation alone.17
Men’s basketball coaches are not far behind: in 2005–06, the coaches of the 
65 Division I teams in the NCAA tournament had an average maximum compen-
sation of $959,486, with the top-paid coach earning a guaranteed salary of $2.1 
million and a maximum salary of $3.4 million.18 The salaries have continued to 
grow. For instance, in 2009, the University of Kentucky agreed to pay John Cali-
pari a guaranteed $31.65 million (plus incentives) over eight years. These figures 
exclude bonuses as well as extensive perquisites, including free use of cars, housing 
subsidies, country club memberships, private jet service, exceptionally generous 
severance packages, and more. The coaches also have handsome opportunities to 
earn outside income via apparel or sneaker endorsements, the lecture circuit and 
book contracts.
Not surprisingly, assistant coaches have also experienced an explosion in 
their pay packages in recent years. For instance, Tennessee lured its new defensive 
coordinator in 2009, Monte Kiffin, with a $1.2 million salary, a $300,000 bonus 
for staying through the end of the regular season19, up to another $100,000 in 
incentives and the use of two cars. The average salary for the nine assistant foot-
ball coaches at Tennessee was $369,000 in 2009. USA Today identified over 100 
assistant coaches in the FBS who receive over $250,000 in base compensation. 
Bob Stoops, Oklahoma’s head football coach, is guaranteed $4.3 million in 2009 
and his nine assistants will total nearly $2.5 million before bonuses. Alabama and 
LSU also boast $6 million-plus staffs (Wieberg, 2009).
Back in 1924, Centenary College in Shreveport, Louisiana, the nation’s first 
liberal arts college west of the Mississippi, was denied accreditation by the Southern 
Association of Colleges and Schools because the school placed an “undue empha-
sis on athletics.” The primary evidence of Centenary’s misplaced priorities by the 
Southern Association was that the college paid its football coach more than it paid 
its college president. The next year the football coach was gone and the college 
gained accreditation (Johnson, 2008).
More recently, the legendary head football coach at the University of Alabama 
(1958–1982), Bear Bryant, adhered to a firm policy of always keeping his salary 
$1 below that of the school president. Bryant believed that it was symbolically 
Dollar Dilemmas During the Downturn    117
important for the university president to be paid more than the head football coach 
(Barra, 2005).
Defenders of the multimillion dollar head coaches’ salaries are wont to repeat 
the mantra: “Coaches’ compensation packages are driven by market forces.” Fair 
enough, but what drives the market forces? It is clear that the market for coaches 
is sustained by several artificial factors: (a) there is no compensation paid to the 
athletes; (b) intercollegiate sports benefit from substantial tax privileges; (c) there 
are no shareholders demanding dividend distributions or higher profits to bolster 
stock prices; (d) athletic departments are nourished by university and state-wide 
financial support; and, (e) coaches’ salaries are negotiated by athletic directors 
whose own worth rises with the salaries of their employees.
In a normal competitive market, college football coaches would not be getting 
compensated almost at the same level as NFL coaches. The top 32 college football 
programs generate revenues in the $40–70 million range; the average NFL team 
generates around $230 million.
The central point is that if the NCAA placed, say, a $400,000 limit on coaches’ 
compensation packages, it would not affect the quality of coaching or the level of 
intercollegiate competition one iota. This is because the next best alternative for 
top college coaches (the reservation wage) is likely to be well below this level. 
Anything above the reservation wage is what economists call economic rent.
It is clear that coaches are being paid in part for the value produced by the 
athletes they recruit, who do not get paid. That is, the marginal revenue product of 
the star players accrues largely to the head coach, rather than to the players. This is 
reason enough to cap coaches’ salaries. It is more reason because much of the work 
of recruiting is done by assistant coaches and much of the attraction a school has 
to a player has to do with the school’s conference, its reputation and its facilities, 
all factors independent of the head coach.
Finally, coaches’ compensation does not appear to be significantly correlated 
with team performance. While one could make the argument that certain coaches 
have turned around the fortunes of a team, taking it from oblivion to prominence 
over the course of a few years, and, therefore, they have added sufficiently to the 
school’s revenues to justify their high salaries, such coaches are few and far between. 
Even in these cases, it is the athletes who are producing the winning teams and 
their compensation is being suppressed. In the end, only ten schools can be in the 
top ten rankings and the average win percentage of all schools will always be .500. 
Nonetheless, virtually every head football coach in the FBS earns over $1 million. 
This obviously includes coaches of perennially losing teams.
I collected data on compensation levels of head coaches in Division I men’s bas-
ketball and Division IA football and compared these levels to different measurements 
of team performance. I ran multiple regressions and panel regressions to explore the 
extent of correlation between coaches’ salaries and team performance with different 
lag structures. The regression results do not suggest that the more highly paid coaches 
are associated with more successful teams in current years; rather, they suggest that 
higher salaries are positively correlated with a school’s historical success. That is, 
team success appears to be correlated with longstanding institutional factors rather 
than the performance of the current coach (Zimbalist, 2010b).20
Thus, there are strong economic and ethical reasons to attempt to cap coaches’ 
salaries.21 Doing so would save millions of dollars for the typical FBS program.
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Reduce the Number of Football Scholarships
Another example of extravagance is the size of FBS football teams. DIA football 
teams do not need 85 scholarships. Sixty would do fine.22 NFL teams have a maxi-
mum active roster of 45, plus a maximum inactive roster of 8 additional players.23 
The average FBS team has 32 walk-ons plus 85 scholarship players (NCAA, 2008, 
p. 27). If football scholarships were cut to 60, the average college would probably 
save over $1 million annually24—easily enough to finance an average FBS soccer 
team plus an average FBS golf team, or an FBS tennis team plus gymnastics team, 
and have several hundred thousand dollars left over (Fulks, 2009, p. 37). Even 
assuming the number of walk-ons would not increase with the lower scholarship 
limit, the average squad size would still be 92.
Introduce an FBS Playoff System
In 88 other varsity sports and divisions, the NCAA has organized playoff compe-
titions for national championships. In FCS, Division II and Division III football 
there are playoffs, some with 16 teams. Only in FBS football does the NCAA not 
organize a national championship playoff. Instead, the NCAA has allowed its six 
equity conferences organize their own putative national championship that involves 
no playoff, but instead substitutes its own highly flawed, unfair and anticompetitive 
BCS five-game bowl system.
First, the BCS system is flawed because the method it uses to select its ten 
participating teams, including its top two teams for the national championship, that 
includes an inadequately and improperly specified set of criteria in its computer 
algorithms and a coaches’ survey that involves both a conflict of interest and unbal-
anced information (Zimbalist, 2010a).25 Ultimately, there is always a dispute about 
the selected teams and always a doubt about whether the true national champion 
has been crowned. The fact of the matter is that no system is perfect, but there 
is a U.S. sporting culture that embraces a playoff system. In a playoff, the teams 
compete against each other on the field to see who is better. Playoffs prevail in all 
other NCAA championships and throughout professional sports. The championship 
is not left up to a largely arbitrary numerical and subjective system.
Second, the BCS system is unfair because it distributes its slots for BCS games 
as well as the revenue from these games prejudicially. The six equity conferences 
that created and control the BCS system each have their conference champions 
receive an automatic berth to one of the five BCS bowls. In 2008–09, each of the 
six automatic qualifying (AQ) conferences received a guaranteed $18.6 million. 
The five non-AQ conferences in the FBS can earn an automatic berth if either: 
(a) the team ranks in the top 12 of the final BCS standings, or (b) the team ranks 
in the top 16 of the final BCS standings and its ranking is higher than that of the 
champion of one of the BCS conferences. However, no more than one team from 
a non-AQ conference can earn an automatic berth in any given year; thus, there is 
no automatic berth for a second non-AQ team.26 If a non-AQ team does compete 
in a BCS bowl, its conference received only $9.8 million in 2008–09, or just little 
over half of what an AQ conference received.
Overall, during the first 12 years of the BCS system, there have been 98 appear-
ances by BCS conference teams and only 6 appearances by non-BCS conference 
teams, five of which occurred during the last four years. A non-AQ team has never 
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been selected to participate in the national championship game, and, given the 
parameters in the selection process, it is unlikely in the extreme that one ever will 
be selected. During the three-year period 2007–09, total payouts from the BCS 
bowls amounted to $410.1 million, of which $355.1 million (or 86.6%) went to 
BCS conferences.27 The effect of this lopsided selection and distribution process 
is to calcify the FBS into a caste system.
Third, the BCS system is anticompetitive because it restricts output (quantita-
tively and qualitatively) and reduces consumer welfare. Currently, there are only five 
BCS bowl games, and, of these, only one is relevant to deciding the putative national 
champion. In an eight-team playoff, there would be seven games and all seven would 
be relevant to deciding the national champion. All 120 schools in the FBS would 
be equally eligible for selection and a broader cross-section of the country would 
be interested in the results. It is not imaginable that the television contracts would 
grow by anything less than 100% under the circumstance of an eight-team playoff.28
Over the years, the BCS has offered a series of justifications for its system. I 
discuss these at length elsewhere (Zimbalist, 2010a). In my view, these rationales 
are patently self-serving and unconvincing.
In addition to creating a fairer and more revenue-enhancing system, an FBS 
playoff would have one other significant salutary impact. The revenue from an 
NCAA-organized FBS playoff would be distributed more equally across the 120 
schools in the FBS, and it would share more of the revenue with the other schools 
in the rest of Division I, as well as share 4.37% with Division II and 3.18% with 
Division III. Not only would this help narrow the growing divide between rich and 
poor athletic programs, but it would blunt the incentives to chase football success. 
With a smaller payoff, schools will have less incentive to spend for coaches, for 
recruiting, for facilities, etc., and the arms’ race should be slowed down.
The Prospects for Implementing Structural Reform
I have no illusions that deep reform will come easily. People have been trying to 
thwart the juggernaut of commercialization in college sports since the 1890s. What 
is different now is that the financial stakes have multiplied, the athletics bottom 
line has become acutely more problematic, and the traditional university model is 
suffering. The necessity for incremental change has already been recognized by 
the Division I Athletic Directors. These sensibilities are only heightened by the 
difficult macroeconomic environment.
College presidents are expressing more interest in serious reform measures and 
a 2009 survey of FBS presidents sponsored by the Knight Commission identified 
astronomical coaches’ salaries as college sports most urgent financial problem.29 
Members of Congress and President Obama have manifested concern over the 
absence of a playoff system in the FBS.
Whether this energy can be harnessed and mobilized into an effective reform 
movement remains to be seen. The same college presidents who identified high 
coaches’ salaries as financial enemy number one evinced pessimism about being 
able to do anything about the problem. Most appear to be skeptical about seeking 
an antitrust exemption from the U.S. Congress. There is an unspecified fear that 
if colleges invite government into their business, then Congress will seek greater 
control and regulation over it.
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But why would some intervention by the government be so bad? Since 1995, 
the NCAA has faced many major legal challenges, beginning with the restrictive 
earnings coaches suit, and continuing with the N.I.T. antitrust case against the 
NCAA’s March Madness, the preseason tournament limitation rule case, the cost 
of attendance versus scholarship limit litigation brought by Jason White, the Ohio 
baseball player (Andrew Oliver) suit against the NCAA which prohibits the use 
of lawyers by players to discuss professional contracts, the Keller and O’Bannon 
cases over current and former college players’ publicity rights. The NCAA has 
not fared well in most of these cases and, in my view, its prospects are not good in 
the last two. Most of these matters, even though some have reached costly settle-
ment, have not been put to rest. The NCAA’s hybrid model, combining elements 
of amateurism and professionalism, seems to engender legal ambiguity and invite 
litigation. The NCAA could use some help it seems and a bit of Congressional 
intervention may prove constructive.
That said, the U.S. Congress is already well aware of issues in college sports 
and has called numerous hearings to explore them. The U.S. government is deeply 
involved in matters concerning higher education and even in intercollegiate sports 
via programs such as Title IX and Pell Grants. The IRS has reevaluated its taxing 
policies with regard to donations for seating priorities and UBIT, as has the Congres-
sional Budget Office. In short, the government does not need a discussion around 
a partial antitrust exemption for the NCAA to tempt it to become more intrusive. 
As renown journalist and former U.S. State Department official Hodding Carter III 
stated recently: if college sports wants government out of its business, then college 
sports should remove its snout from the government trough.
Another obstacle to reform is the NCAA itself. The Association, in essence, 
functions as a trade association for coaches, athletic directors and conference 
commissioners. The few college presidents who have become involved in NCAA 
committees often tend to be passionate sports fans and have little instinct to rock 
the boat. All presidents who serve on NCAA committees are expected to represent 
the interests of their conference. President Bernie Machen at the University of 
Florida was quoted in the Sports Business Journal as saying that the SEC would 
not allow him to be the conference representative because he believes there should 
be a more equitable distribution of BCS monies.30
The vast majority of presidents who do not serve on NCAA committees gener-
ally have abdicated responsibility for their sports programs to the ADs and, second-
arily, to the provosts and faculty athletic representatives whom they appoint. The 
ADs and coaches have little motivation to reduce the number of football scholarships 
or to seek an antitrust exemption that might lead to the decimation of their salaries.
The representation on NCAA committees is heavily weighted toward Division I, 
and within Division I toward the FBS, and within the FBS toward the BCS or equity 
conferences. Given this power structure, it is understandable why the NCAA has 
not pushed for a football playoff in the FBS. What all this means is that momentum 
and pressure for reform will likely have to come from outside the Association.
The history of Title IX instructs us that this is possible. Further, it is becoming 
increasingly apparent that current patterns are not sustainable. Schools are cutting 
back some sports and eliminating others. A few rich programs at the top are thriv-
ing, some are just surviving, but the overwhelming majority of programs realize 
that business as usual is over.
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I think the reforms outlined above are possible politically. Their intent is to 
preserve and strengthen intercollegiate athletics by putting them on a sounder and 
more equitable financial footing. Whether they come to fruition will depend upon 
the organizational effort and skill that is put behind them. One thing is certain: if 
reform-minded university presidents and others give up before they begin, as many 
appear to have done in their answers to the Knight Commission survey, then no 
productive change will result.
Notes
1. Only 18 schools generated a net operating surplus over the five-year period 2003–04 through 
2007–08. These figures do not include most or all of capital spending on the cost side, nor do they 
include all of the indirect costs associated with running the athletics program, among other problems.
2. For more analysis of the trends for athletic expenses to grow more rapidly than athletic 
revenues or university educational expenses, also see: Litan, Orszag & Orszag, 2003; Orszag & 
Orszag, 2005: and, Orszag & Israel, 2009.
3. Information Sheet on Intercollegiate Athletics and Faculty Resolution, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, November 2009. Meanwhile, the Berkeley faculty senate, in the face of academic 
cuts, voted to end all subsidies to the school’s athletics department. A month later, the faculty 
senate at the University of Texas issued a similar protest after the football coach’s contract was 
renegotiated upward to exceed $5 million annually.
4. If there are no empty beds, then there is an opportunity cost to giving an athlete a scholar-
ship; namely, the place could have been occupied by a student paying the face value (or a portion 
thereof) of the school’s tuition, room and board.
5. Such claims often begin with the invocation of the legendary Flutie effect, named for Doug 
Flutie’s dramatic 1984 touchdown pass which lifted Boston College over the University of Miami. 
The Flutie effect, however, is chimerical. Boston College’s application increases of 16% in 1984 
and 12% in 1985 (not the 30–40% often cited in media reports) were consistent with the underly-
ing trend rate at the school (McDonald, 2003).
6. Pope and Pope (2009) review the literature and run additional tests. They find that certain 
types of athletics success appear to increase interest in a school from applicants with high, low 
and medium SAT scores; they do not find, however, that the initial interest translates into more 
applications or admits from the high SAT group. In the end, they conclude that the “summary data 
in Table 2 would suggest that athletically successful schools actually saw slightly slower long-run 
growth in applications and enrollments” (Pope & Pope, p. 776). Frank (2004) reviews the literature 
as well and arrives at a similar conclusion. Also see, Zimbalist, 2001, ch. 7, and Orszag & Orszag.
7. The 2009 study by Orszag and Israel for the NCAA, for instance, reached the following 
conclusions: “In our previous reports we found no evidence to establish a pattern, positive or nega-
tive, between athletic expenditures and academic quality…. Our updated results continue to show 
no consistent support for such a relationship…. In our previous reports, we found no consistent 
evidence for a relationship between operating expenditures on sports and alumni giving. Using 
data from 2004-07, … we do not consider the observed statistical relationship between athletic 
expenditures and alumni giving to be robust enough to suggest a causal relationship.” Orszag & 
Israel, pp. 10–11. In addition, see Frank.
8. See Stinson & Howard, 2007; and, Humphreys & Mondello, 2007.
9. See, for instance, Rhoads & Gerking, 2000.
10. This theoretical expectation is consistent with the empirical finds in Orszag and Israel, p. 
6, where they find that an additional dollar of athletics spending leads to an additional dollar of 
revenue, i.e., there is a zero net return to the spending.
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11. This growing divide occurs both across and within conferences. When it is within confer-
ences, competitive balance of the on-field competition is threatened. Iowa State, Nebraska and 
Texas all play football in the Big 12 conference, one of the six BCS conferences. According to 
data from the most recent EADA reports, Iowa State’s football revenue was $17 million, while that 
of Nebraska was $49 million and that of Texas was $73 million. See http://ope.ed.gov/athletics.
12. Weiner, J. (2009).
13. See the O’Bannon and Keller lawsuits.
14. For a discussion of some of these measures and where they have been implemented, see, 
for one, Smith, 2009.
15. It may also be the case that some of the AD’s proposed reforms, such as eliminating certain 
teams or restricting the number of scholarships, will provoke antitrust challenges from affected 
athletes. In this case, an antitrust exemption would be protection for the NCAA.
16. In a sample of 45 Division I public universities, Duke economist Charles Clotfelter found 
that between 1986 and 2007, the average compensation of full professors rose 30%, while that of 
university presidents grew 100%, that of head basketball coaches jumped 400% and that of head 
football coaches increased 500%. (Clotfelter had full data on basketball salaries for 22 schools 
and on football salaries for 45.)
17. Pete Carroll’s compensation at USC in 2009–10 reportedly was $4.4 million. Alabama’s 
football coach Nick Saban had his $4 million a year contract extended and enriched in 2009. The 
new contract, in addition to endless, handsome perquisites and a variety of bonuses, guarantees 
him $44 million through 2018. Mack Brown, the football coach at the University of Texas, did 
Saban one better: signed later in 2009 Brown’s new contract provides for a guaranteed $5 million 
salary in 2010, with annual increases of $100,000, through 2016.
18. The sources for these figures are discussed in the statistical section below.
19. As it turns out, Monte Kiffin did finish the regular season at Tennessee—but just barely. On 
January 12, 2010, he and his son (Lane Kiffin, the head coach) decided to leave Tennessee after 
one year to follow a better offer from USC, replacing Pete Carroll who had departed for the NFL’s 
Seattle Seahawks amid various investigations around improprieties of the program at USC.
20. See Zimbalist, 2010b, forthcoming, for more details. Orszag & Israel reach similar conclu-
sions.
21. To be sure, as with any piece of legislation circumscribing the market, there will be efforts 
to avert the controls. That is, if compensation limits are imposed, schools will look for ways to 
indirectly remunerate coaches. The U.S. Congress need not concern itself with these details if it 
grants the NCAA a partial antitrust exemption; if the NCAA takes advantage of such an exemp-
tion, the Association will have to detail the regulation so as to minimize transgression. It would 
probably be unwise to apply a Bryant Rule, limiting coach’s pay to that of the university president, 
because this will likely engender significant inflation in presidents’ pay. An alternative would be 
to limit head coaches’ pay to, say, 300% above that of the average salary of all assistant professors 
at the school or in the conference. There would also have to be a limit imposed on the value of 
all benefits and perquisites at, say, 40% of the compensation maximum, as well as a restriction 
on outside income, requiring most of it to be channeled through the university.
22. College coaches have protested that college football teams cannot be properly compared with 
professional teams. The latter, they say, can always call up reserves when players get injured, but 
college teams must have players on their rosters to replace the injured. First, NFL teams have a 
maximum of 16 players on reserve and practice squads to complement their 45-men active rosters. 
Second, the NCAA Injury Surveillance System Summary reports that for the 2000–01 season, 
the serious-injury rate during games in football was 14.1 per 1000 exposures, while the rate in 
football practices was 1.6 per 1000. If we assume that 60 players enter a game and the team plays 
13 games during the year (that is, including a postseason game), then the average total number 
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of serious injuries (where a player is out sever or more days) from games is 11 per year. If on 
average each such player misses two games, then the average number of game-injured players is 
1.69 per game. Performing a similar calculation for practice-injured players yields 1.48 per game 
for a combined average of 3.17 injured players per game. This hardly constitutes a justification 
for carrying 85 scholarship and 117 total players on an FBS team.
23. Teams are also allowed to carry up to 8 additional players on their practice squad.
24. This number is based on 25 men’s scholarships at $30,000 each, plus the possibility of sav-
ings on women’s scholarships and the probable reduction in athletic support staff and equipment.
25. See Zimbalist, 2010a, for an elaboration on this analysis.
26. If two or more non-BCS teams satisfy the “automatic berth” provisions, then the team 
with the highest BCS rank will receive the automatic berth, and the remaining teams will be 
considered for an at-large selection (i.e., chosen at the discretion of the host bowl committee). As 
always, Notre Dame gets special treatment as an independent: it receives an automatic berth if it 
finishes in the top 8 in the BCS standings. In 2009, the BCS is working with another tweak in its 
selection formula. As explained on the BCS site, http://www.bcsfootball.org/cfb/story/5900394/
Bowl-Championship-Series-FAQ: “Each conference will be evaluated over a four-year period 
based on the [sic] three elements: the average rank of the highest ranked team; the average rank 
of all conference teams; and the number of teams in the top 25.” As explained in the text, there 
are a number of factors that rigidify the status of automatic berth conferences. In the extremely 
improbable event that during the course of a four-year cycle one of the automatic berth confer-
ences is threatened, the BCS conferences can always modify the procedures again, as it is the 
BCS conferences that govern the system.
27. BCS conferences actually earn additional revenue. Under BCS rules, BCS conferences 
are required to purchase 50% of the seats at BCS bowls, but they pay only 60% of each ticket’s 
face value. Schools apparently sell discounted tickets to students, but sell full price tickets to 
alumni, to boosters and to other fans. Of course, for some matchups, such as the 2008–09 contest 
between Cincinnati and Virginia Tech, the BCS schools will have to sell most of their tickets at 
the discounted price and their revenue gain will be more modest.
28. Of course, a sixteen-team playoff, which is practiced in the FCS and Division III football, 
would generate even more excitement and revenue. One plausible selection process for an eight-
team playoff would be to choose the conference champions from the FBS conferences which 
had the eight best records. Jim Delaney, the commissioner of the Big Ten conference, told the 
House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection on December 7, 2005, that 
a playoff system would increase television rights fees by hundreds of millions of dollars. Darren 
Rovell (2008[AUQ1]) estimates that rights fee would go up 2.5 times initially, and even more 
after the Rose Bowl is collapsed into the mix. Cowen (2003) cites Neil Pilson who estimates that 
there would be a big boost in TV rights fees from a playoff structure. DeLoss Dodds, AD at the 
University of Texas, believes that a playoff system would be so popular that it would add at least 
an extra $1 million in revenue for every team playing Division IA football. Others have offered 
similar estimates, see A. Zimbalist, 2010a.
29. This survey is available at www.knightcommission.org. College presidents have been histori-
cally loathe to address the need for athletic reform. The average tenure of a college president is 
around six years; building a coalition for reform takes a long time and risks incurring the wrath 
of the trustees, the local boosters, many alumni and students. Several college presidents who 
have been outspoken about the need to reform found themselves pushed out of office. Given that 
no effective reform has thwarted the commercial juggernaut of college sports in over a century 
and given the long list of pressing matters concerning college governance, it is simply not in a 
president’s interest to concentrate on athletics.
30. Machen was previously president of the University of Utah, sensitizing him to the perspec-
tive of the nonequity conferences in the FBS.
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